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ne of the oldest and most useful ideas in economics is the quantity
theory of money. The quantity theory explains the determination of
variables measured in dollars such as the price level. Modern exposi-
tions of the quantity theory assume that the monetary authority controls directly
a reserve aggregate like the monetary base (currency plus bank deposits with
the monetary authority). In actual practice, however, monetary authorities use
an interest rate rather than a reserve aggregate as their policy variable. This fact
poses a challenge to the quantity theorist. How does he reconcile his theory
with actual policy procedures? There are no modern expositions of the quantity
theory that assume interest rate targeting by the monetary authority.
This article provides such an exposition. The exposition brings out the
standard quantity theory distinction between the determination of the real and
nominal quantity of money and explains changes in the price level as equating
the nominal demand with the nominal supply of money.
Modern expositions of the quantity theory assume reserve control in part
because reserve control constitutes a major item on the reform agenda of quan-
tity theorists. Control of reserves and, at one remove, a monetary aggregate
constitutes control of a nominal variable and, therefore, draws attention to the
responsibility of the monetary authority to control the price level, also a nom-
inal variable. Quantity theorists dislike the interest rate as a policy variable.
Interest rate control suggests that the monetary authority is controlling the
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price of resources made available to investors. The analysis here retains these
concerns. In particular, the article explains how rate targeting encourages the
public to confuse the monetary authority’s control over nominal variables with
control over real variables. These concerns motivate a proposal for a change in
monetary policy procedures designed to help the Fed achieve its goal of price
stability.
1. AN EXAMPLE AND SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
An Example of Money Creation
Suppose the monetary authority sets a target for the interest rate and follows a
“lean-against-the-wind” policy of raising its rate target when economic activity
strengthens and lowering it when economic activity weakens. Because infor-
mation on the economy becomes available with a lag, the monetary authority
would then supply reserves when economic activity strengthens and withdraw
them when economic activity weakens. Furthermore, it would not necessarily
offset these changes in reserves later. As a result, random disturbances would be
permanently incorporated into future levels of reserves and money. By follow-
ing a “let bygones-be-bygones” policy of base drift in reserves, the monetary
authority causes the price level to wander randomly.1
Suppose also that introduction of a new technology raises the rate of return
on capital and, therefore, investment demand. When the market rate, reﬂecting
this higher return, begins to rise above its targeted level, the monetary authority
buys securities. As a result, the monetary base and the money stock increase.2
The individuals who sold securities to the monetary authority did so be-
cause they were offered a good price, not because they wanted to reduce their
holdings of assets. After selling securities, they allocate their additional money
among different assets to replace the securities sold. Temporarily, the increased
demand for ﬁnancial assets depresses the interest rate. Consequently, real ex-
penditure rises until the price level increases sufﬁciently to return real money
balances to their original level. Real money balances return to their original
level through a rise in the price level, not through a fall in the nominal quantity
of money.
1 The idea that rate pegging by the monetary authority makes nominal variables into a random
walk is mentioned in Friedman’s (1969, p. 104) “The Role of Monetary Policy” and is developed
systematically in Goodfriend (1987).
2 This exposition can be compared to Friedman (1969), who uses the notion of a helicopter
drop of money. The counterpart here to the helicopter is rate smoothing in the presence of a
positive real sector disturbance.      
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Real Versus Nominal and the Natural Rate Assumption
An understanding of the consequences of the monetary authority’s reserve in-
jection begins with the distinction between real and nominal variables. Real
variables are real quantities or relative prices. A real quantity is usually mea-
sured in physical units. The real quantity of money is a measure of the pur-
chasing power or command over goods represented by the nominal quantity
of money. A relative price is the price of a commodity expressed in terms
of another commodity. The real rate of interest is a relative price measuring
the price of commodities today in terms of commodities in the future. It is the
market interest rate adjusted for expected inﬂation. In contrast to real variables,
nominal variables are dollar amounts or dollar prices. Thus the nominal quantity
of money is the number of dollars the public holds. A special case of a nominal
variable is the market interest rate, which is the price of a dollar today in dollars
tomorrow.
An individual’s welfare depends upon his real income (the purchasing
power of income measured in terms of goods) and the relative prices of the
goods he consumes (the scarcity of those goods in terms of other goods). An
individual is better off if his real income increases so he can consume more
of all goods. He is no better off if his dollar income (and cash balances)
increases, but at the same time all dollar prices increase by the same amount
so his real income is unchanged. The idea that people care about real, not
nominal, variables is called the natural rate assumption (hypothesis).3
The monetary authority controls a nominal variable—the monetary base. It
follows from the natural rate assumption that the rise in the real rate of interest,
which is governed by real factors like investment opportunities and the public’s
thrift, can only be restrained temporarily by changes in money creation. Sim-
ilarly, the real quantity of money desired by the public is not changed by an
injection of reserves. After the reserve injection, at the original price level, the
public holds a larger quantity of real money balances than desired. The price
level must rise to return real money balances to their desired, lower value.
The natural rate assumption thus implies that the monetary authority cannot
maintain an arbitrary target for the interest rate. Although the interest rate is
a nominal variable, its equilibrium value is the sum of the real rate consistent
with equilibrium in the economy (the natural rate) and an inﬂation premium
equal to the inﬂation expected by the public. If the monetary authority sets a
3 Alternatively, one can say that individual choice is not affected by money illusion. Different
economists, of course, give empirical content to the natural rate assumption in different ways.
Most monetarists, for example, assign considerable importance to temporary effects of money on
real variables because of transitory confusion between changes in the price level and changes in
relative prices and because of the existence of contracts in nominal terms. The key assumption
is that these monetary nonneutralities are transitory so that the monetary authority has no ability
to affect real variables in a sustained or systematic way.      
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rate target below the equilibrium market rate (the nominal natural rate), banks
have an incentive to acquire assets and their deposits and the money stock
increase.4 The public’s money balances then rise above their desired level. The
public responds by spending at a faster rate and the inﬂation rate rises.
Nominal Determinacy
A corollary to the natural rate assumption that the public cares only about real
variables is the proposition that only the monetary authority can give nom-
inal variables well-deﬁned (determinate) equilibrium values. Patinkin (1965)
showed that when the monetary authority targets the monetary base, the price
level is made determinate through a real balance effect. A rise in the price
level above its equilibrium value reduces the real value of the base and nomi-
nal money. This fall in real balances restrains the public’s real expenditure until
the price level falls back to its equilibrium value.
When the monetary authority targets an interest rate, however, the monetary
base varies endogenously, that is, with the demand for it by the public. If the
monetary authority does no more than specify an interest rate target, even one
equal to the economy’s nominal natural rate, a random movement in the price
level will induce a corresponding change in the demand for nominal bank credit
and, consequently, in the supply of nominal bank deposits and money. Changes
in the money supply then validate the changes in money demand produced
by changes in the price level, and the price level possesses no equilibrium
value.
If the monetary authority targets an interest rate, it must provide a nominal
reference point that gives nominal variables well-deﬁned values. It does so by
giving the expected future price level a well-deﬁned value. Although with a
rate target the monetary base is determined endogenously, the monetary author-
ity limits the public’s demand for it indirectly by giving the future price level
expected by the public a well-deﬁned value (Dotsey and King 1983; McCallum
1986). One way to understand nominal determinacy with rate targeting is to
compare it to the way a monetary authority achieves nominal determinacy by
exchange rate targeting. Assume the Fed targets the Deutsche mark price of a
dollar. As shown in equation (1), the DM/$ exchange rate equals the product of
the ratio of the German price level (DM/German good) to the U.S. price level
($/U.S. good) and the real terms of trade (German good/U.S. good). The nomi-
nal reference point or benchmark for the dollar is the German price level. If the
U.S. price level rises above its equilibrium level, the foreign exchange value of
the dollar falls, and the Fed buys dollars with Deutsche marks. The monetary
4 The terminology “nominal natural rate” and “natural rate” is in Friedman’s (1969, p. 101)
“The Role of Monetary Policy.”            
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With a rate target, the nominal benchmark is the expected future price
level. In the case of a rate target, the Fed targets the price of today’s dollars
($t) in terms of tomorrow’s dollars ($t+1), or one plus the interest rate (1+rt).
As shown in equation (2), this price equals the product of the ratio of the
future price level expected by the public to the contemporaneous price level
and the real terms of trade with the future. If the price level were to rise
above its equilibrium value, the ratio of the expected future price level to the
contemporaneous price level would fall, that is, expected inﬂation would fall.
Consequently, the inﬂation premium in the interest rate would decline. The
resulting decline in the interest rate would increase the demand for money. It
would also prompt the monetary authority to sell securities and decrease the
monetary base. Because the demand for money would increase, while the sup-
ply would decrease, an excess demand for money would return the price level
to its equilibrium value. If the price level were to deviate from its equilibrium
value, a relative price effect would be created, analogous to a real balance
effect, that would return the price level to its equilibrium value.5


















A Graphical Presentation of the Quantity Theory
The quantity theory can be summarized with the money demand and supply
schedules of Figure 1, which determine the nominal money stock and the goods
price of money (the inverse of the price level). For the reasons explained in
5 In practice, the monetary authority does not tie down the expected future price level by
targeting a ﬁxed value of the price level. Instead, it allows the price level to vary in response
to shocks. It must, however, impart inertia to changes in the public’s expectation of the future
price level relative to changes in its contemporaneous value. It does so through its dislike for
large jumps in nominal prices. Goodfriend (1987) deﬁnes jumps relative to expected values. He
assumes that the monetary authority dislikes both discrepancies between the contemporaneous
price level and the prior period’s expectation of the contemporaneous price level and between
the contemporaneous price level and the expected future price level. In this way, the monetary
authority imposes a level and a change constraint on prices that make the public’s expectation of
the future price level well deﬁned, while still allowing it to vary.     
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the preceding section, the schedules are well deﬁned because the monetary
authority behaves in a way that allows the public to form an expectation of the
future price level. (See also Hetzel [1988].)
The nominal money demand schedule (Md
t ) is the product of the price level
and the demand for real money. Because increases in the price level (reductions
in the inverse of the price level) cause proportional increases in the demand for
nominal money, the demand schedule is negatively sloped. The schedules in
Figure 1 are drawn for a given expectation of the future price level. A rise in
the price level above its equilibrium value, given the public’s expectation of the
future price level, causes a reduction in expected inﬂation. As a consequence,
the market rate of interest falls through a reduction in the inﬂation premium.
The reduction in the market rate generates an increase in the quantity of money
demanded, which adds to the curvature of the money demand schedule.
Under the assumption that the central bank smooths the market rate, the
fall in the market rate due to the rise in the price level just described causes
the monetary authority to reduce the monetary base and the money supply. The
nominal money supply schedule (Ms
t), therefore, is positively sloped. In con-
trast to the money demand schedule, which depends primarily on the behavior
of the public, the money supply schedule depends upon the reserve-supplying
behavior of the monetary authority. Shifts in the money supply schedule depend
upon the extent to which the monetary authority smooths the interest rate, that         
R. L. Hetzel: A Quantity Theory Framework for Monetary Policy 41
is, the extent to which it varies reserves when the interest rate changes. Shifts
in the money supply schedule also depend upon the extent of base drift, that
is, the extent to which, if at all, the monetary authority subsequently offsets
changes in reserves induced by changes in the interest rate. Finally, shifts in
the money supply schedule depend upon the trend rate of growth of reserves,
money, and prices the monetary authority allows.6
These schedules are summarized in the quantity equation (3):
Ms = (k · y) · P, where (k · y) · P = Md. (3)
The fraction of real output (y) the public wants to hold as money is k, which
is a function of variables like the interest rate. The public’s demand for real
money then is (k · y), and its demand for nominal money is (k · y) times the
price level P. The price level varies to make the nominal value of real money
desired by the public (Md) equal to the nominal supply (Ms).
The schedule (Ms
t) shows the rightward shift in the money supply schedule
discussed in Section 2, where the monetary authority smooths the interest rate
during a positive real sector disturbance to aggregate demand. The graphical
illustration of this example highlights the key ideas of the quantity theory.
First, it is useful to organize an understanding of the price level by classifying
variables according to the way in which they affect money demand and supply
schedules. Second, the money supply schedule, whose behavior is dominated
by the monetary authority, shifts independently of the money demand sched-
ule. Third, because the equilibrium values of real variables are ultimately tied
down by real factors, shifts in the money supply schedule eventually appear as
changes in the price level.
Over periods of time too short for the price level to vary sufﬁciently to
equate the nominal quantity of money supplied and demanded, it is useful to
view nominal output, rather than the price level, as the equilibrating variable,
as in equation (4).
Ms = k · (y · P) = k · Y, where k · Y = Md (4)
Nominal output (Y) is the product of real output (y) and the price level (P).
Figure 2 illustrates equation (4). If at the actual level of nominal output
money supply Ms exceeds money demand Md,1 / Yt exceeds its equilibrium
6 The money supply schedule depends upon the behavior of the monetary authority sum-
marized in its reserves-supply function and the behavior of commercial banks and the public
summarized in the reserves-money multiplier. With rate targeting, the key behavioral relationships
of the money supply function concern the former rather than the latter relationship. Fluctuations
in the reserves-currency and reserves-deposits ratios of the reserves-money multiplier are auto-
matically offset at the prevailing funds rate target. For example, if currency ﬂows out of banks
or if banks increase the desired level of excess reserves, the funds rate rises. In order to maintain
its funds rate target, the monetary authority supplies reserves, thereby accommodating changes in
these ratios and avoiding a change in deposits.        
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value, and the public will increase its expenditure in an attempt to reduce its
money holdings. The result will be to raise nominal expenditure until nominal
output rises (1/Y falls) to its equilibrium value.7
Quantity Theory and Monetarist Hypotheses
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) have given the quantity theory a
speciﬁc form, often referred to as monetarism, through their hypothesis that
shifts in the money supply schedule have been large relative to shifts in the
money demand schedule.8 Their hypothesis possesses two distinct parts. The
ﬁrst is that large shifts in the money supply schedule have destabilized the
7 Figure 2 is drawn assuming a given expectation of the future level of nominal output. Be-
cause nominal output is the product of the price level and real output, the slopes of its schedules are
determined by the relationship of the contemporaneous price level relative to the expected future
price level, as explained for Figure 1. The relationship of contemporaneous real output relative to
expected future real output reinforces these price relationships. A level of real output that is high
relative to expected future real output causes the public to save a relatively large fraction of its
income and depresses the real rate. The resulting decline in the market rate increases the demand
for money by lowering money’s opportunity cost. Also, the supply of money falls because of rate
smoothing by the monetary authority.
8 Friedman prefers the term quantity theory to monetarism, which was coined by the staff of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for an article in their Review by Karl Brunner (1968). A
number of economists helped revive the quantity theory in the United States, for example, Karl
Brunner and Allan Meltzer, Phillip Cagan, Thomas Mayer, William Poole, and Clark Warburton.   
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behavior of nominal and real income. Their empirical evidence for this part is
twofold. They show that turning points in the rate of growth of the money stock
have preceded turning points in the business cycle. They also argue that shifts
in the money supply schedule can often be attributed to speciﬁc historical cir-
cumstances rather than to contemporaneous changes in economic activity. The
second part of their general hypothesis is that much of the observed variability
in real money demand has resulted from prior actions of the monetary authority.
Speciﬁcally, destabilizing shifts in the money supply schedule have produced
destabilizing shifts in the money demand schedule. These empirical general-
izations lead Friedman (1959) to recommend moderate, stable money growth.
There is now a consensus that the quantity theory is the only useful frame-
work for explaining the long-run behavior of prices. The monetary authority can
shift the money supply schedule independently of the money demand schedule
so that it can control the long-run behavior of the price level. The magnitude
of secular shifts in the money demand function is limited by real factors like
growth in real income and payments technology. There is no such limitation
on the behavior of the money supply. Over long periods of time, inﬂation
has reﬂected the behavior of the money supply. There is less consensus over
Friedman and Schwartz’s hypotheses about the monetary causes of the business
cycle and the stability of money demand. The basic quantity theory assumption
that the price level is a monetary phenomenon does not require acceptance of
these latter two hypotheses, however.
2. THE QUANTITY THEORY AS A GUIDE FOR POLICY
Interest rate targeting encourages the public to confuse the role of the monetary
authority, which is to control the nominal quantity of money and the price level,
with the role of commercial banks, which is to set a real rate of interest that
rations available resources to investors. The quantity theory counters this con-
fusion through its distinction between money and credit and between nominal
and real variables.
The monetary authority is responsible for the money creation of commer-
cial banks. In addition to creating deposits, commercial banks ration credit by
setting its price, the real interest rate. When the monetary authority targets an
interest rate, the public is encouraged to assume that the monetary authority
can control the credit rationing of commercial banks. The public then assumes
that the monetary authority can ensure a steady ﬂow of credit to the economy
and can avoid “large” changes in the price of credit. When the monetary au-
thority tries to manage the extension of credit, the money supply becomes a
function of credit demand. The resulting changes in money require changes
in the price level. The view of monetary policy as the management of credit
has at times produced large deﬂations as in the Depression and, at other times,
large inﬂations as in wartime.   
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When the commercial banking system extends credit by adding to the as-
sets it holds, it must persuade the public to hold a larger real value of deposits.
If this intermediation does not simply draw funds away from other forms of
intermediation, the increase in bank deposits must correspond to a reduction
in consumption by the public. When the monetary authority extends credit by
acquiring an asset, however, it does no more than create through a bookkeeping
operation the corresponding liabilities (the monetary base). Because monetary
base creation requires no one to refrain from consumption, it does not increase
the resources available to investors. A “central bank” does not intermediate
between savers and investors. It is not a bank, and it cannot increase the
resources commercial banks make available to investors.
The belief that the monetary authority regulates the ﬂow of credit entails the
implicit assumption that the quantity of money is self-regulating. The fallacy in
this assumption is the failure to distinguish between the mechanism for limiting
real credit extension and that for limiting money creation. As explained below,
the real interest rate limits the quantity of real credit demanded, but not the
nominal quantity of money demanded.
If money were a commodity, its equilibrium quantity would depend upon
its real resource costs of production. The market mechanism that limits the
supply of a commodity through the real costs of production, however, does not
limit the quantity of bank deposits. It is true that banks incur resource costs
in providing deposits. The resources that can be obtained in exchange for a
dollar of deposits, however, greatly exceed the bookkeeping cost of creating
that dollar. Because the resources obtained from creating an additional dollar
exceed the cost of creating that dollar, the monetary authority must limit the
nominal quantity of deposits and money.
The way market forces limit the availability of real credit differs from the
way the monetary authority limits the nominal quantity of money. When a bank
extends credit, it credits the deposits of the borrower. The borrower then draws
down those deposits in order to purchase goods and services. The bank loses
reserves when it loses the deposits. When the bank goes into the market for
reserves (issues CDs or borrows federal funds) to replace the lost reserves, it
must pay the market rate of interest. The real rate implicit in the market rate
limits the real amount of credit banks extend because it conveys information
about the scarcity of resources. The interest rate does not, however, convey
information about the “scarcity” of nominal money.
3. FOMC PROCEDURES IN A QUANTITY THEORY
PERSPECTIVE: A PROPOSED CHANGE
How can the natural rate assumption that the monetary authority cannot control
the real rate in a sustained way be reconciled with the fact that the Federal Open     
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Market Committee (FOMC) uses the funds rate as its policy instrument?9 The
FOMC can use the funds rate to target a nominal variable. The simplest case
would be to set the funds rate to achieve a target for money (McCallum 1981).
As part of such targeting procedures, the Fed shapes the way the public forms
its predictions of the future values of nominal variables. Those predictions, in
particular the expected future value of the price level, make the contempora-
neous price level well deﬁned. With a target for the rate of growth of nominal
output, for example, the expected inﬂation rate would equal the targeted growth
in nominal output minus the expected growth in real output.
An implication of the quantity theory is that, to stabilize the price level,
the monetary authority must set its interest rate target equal to the economy’s
equilibrium rate. Because an interest rate consists of two parts, a real rate
and an inﬂation premium, it follows that the monetary authority must perform
two tasks in setting its rate instrument. First, it must change its instrument in
line with changes in the economy’s equilibrium real rate. Second, as explained
above, it must set the interest rate in a way that allows the public to predict
the future price level.
This section suggests two changes designed to help the monetary author-
ity achieve these two tasks. The ﬁrst requires an explicit target for inﬂation.
The second involves the use of indexed bonds to measure the correspondence
between the monetary authority’s implicit target for inﬂation and the public’s
expectation for inﬂation.10
Milton Friedman (1959) for one has argued that targeting inﬂation or the
price level directly would be destabilizing. For this reason, it would be useful
to use nominal output as an intermediate target. With the suggested changes,
for example, at its December meeting, the FOMC would vote on an explicit
multi-year target path for inﬂation. At the February meeting, FOMC mem-
bers would submit their predictions for real output growth for the current year
9 At times, the FOMC has targeted the funds rate directly. Other times it has targeted the
funds rate indirectly by setting the discount rate and a target for the level of borrowed reserves.
Given the positive relationship between borrowed reserves and the difference between the funds
rate and the discount rate, the latter procedure amounts to an indirect funds rate target.
10 Implementation of the proposal advanced here would require creation of a measure of
expected inﬂation through the issue of Treasury zero-coupon bonds with different maturities.
Half the bonds would be indexed to the price level and half would be conventional, nonindexed
bonds. Unlike holders of the nonindexed bonds, holders of the indexed bonds would not have to
worry about the depreciation due to inﬂation of the dollar payment they receive when their bonds
mature. For this reason, the difference in yield between the nonindexed and indexed bonds would
provide a measure of expected inﬂation. Moreover, the existence of bonds of different maturities
would provide a term structure of expected inﬂation. Given the current value of the price level,
this term structure would yield estimates of the price level expected in future years.
The Fed could issue the indexed bonds. (It would buy short-term securities to offset the result-
ing decline in the monetary base.) It would be better for the Treasury to issue the bonds, however,
because it could issue them in sufﬁcient quantities to ensure a liquid market. For more discussion,
see Hetzel (1992), U.S. Congress (1992a), and the testimony by Michael Boskin, Alan Greenspan,
Representative Stephen Neal, William Poole, and Alan Walters in U.S. Congress (1992b).   
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consistent with the long-run inﬂation target. When combined with the current-
year inﬂation target, the median value of FOMC members’ predictions for real
output growth would yield an intermediate target for nominal output growth.
The Board staff would convert the target for nominal output growth into an
intra-yearly target path in level form. At subsequent FOMC meetings, the Board
staff would display its predictions of nominal output relative to this target path.
Also at the February meeting, the Board staff would continue to make
predictions for money growth for the current year consistent with the inﬂa-
tion target. Subsequent observations of money and nominal output relative to
their intra-yearly paths would offer information useful in assessing whether the
FOMC was achieving its inﬂation target.
Assuming the existence of indexed bonds with varying maturities, the
FOMC would have available a measure of the price level expected by the public
in succeeding years. These observations on the expected price level would be
displayed relative to the multi-year target path for the price level consistent
with the FOMC’s inﬂation targets. In setting the funds rate, the FOMC would
take account of the gap between the targeted path for the price level and the
path expected by the public.
These procedures would keep the funds rate equal to the economy’s equi-
librium rate. They would also make the inﬂation premium in the equilibrium
rate, that is, the inﬂation expected by the public, consistent with the Fed’s
objective for inﬂation. Responding to the measure of expected inﬂation made
available by indexed bonds, the Fed would keep expected inﬂation on target.
4. CONCLUDING COMMENT
With the suggested policy procedures, the FOMC could still use the funds rate
as its policy variable. Changes in the funds rate would appear reasonable in
that they would respond to changes in the real rate as reﬂected in the yield
on the indexed bond. However, changes in the funds rate would be explicitly
directed toward achieving an inﬂation target.
These procedures possess a quantity theory spirit in that they keep the
monetary authority’s attention focused on nominal variables under its control—
the rate of growth of nominal output and the price level. Despite their quantity
theory spirit, the suggested procedures do not depend on stability of the public’s
demand function for money. Money, nevertheless, would play an important role.
The money targets advertise to the public that the price level is a monetary
phenomenon and that monetary authority alone has the responsibility for con-
trol of the price level. Public discussion by the FOMC of its targets for money
would constitute an important way of inﬂuencing the public’s expectation of
the future price level and of keeping that expectation in line with the FOMC’s
target.    
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